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Abstract 
 
This paper applies the interpretative scheme “crisis-initiative-leadership” - 
developed with reference to the European unification process as a whole – to the current 
crises to analyse if and how the crises are being exploited by adequate initiative and 
leadership in the EU.      
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The economic and financial crisis, and then the Greek sovereign debt crisis, have 
put under severe strain the very existence of the Euro. The European Union seems unable 
to respond adequately to these crises. Even when a decision was finally taken on the 9th of 
May – exactly sixty years after the Schuman Declaration which ignited the unification 
process - the financial markets, after an initial rebound, have responded negatively. This 
paper applies an interpretative scheme, developed to analyse actors and timing of the 
European integration process, to the current crisis, in the attempt to draw some lessons 
from past experience and some policy recommendation for the current situation. 
 
1. Crisis, initiative, leadership 
 
The idea that crises provide occasions for Europe to advance is frequent in the 
public and political discourse of many actors of the unification process. Monnet and 
Spinelli’s activities and reflections provide ample evidence of this idea (Monnet 1976; 
Spinelli 1979, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1992a, 1992b). Building on their thought as much as on 
their experience, Mario AlbertiniI theoretically developed an interpretative scheme of the 
European integration process based on three elements: crisis, initiative, leadership (see also 
Castaldi 2005 and 2009). This scheme was an ideal-type, a theoretical abstraction based on 
historical observation, aimed at identifying the elements whose concomitant presence is 
necessary to produce a significant advance in the integration process. It was then used to 
explain why in certain moments such advances had been possible, while at other times 
setbacks or failures occurred; and to identify the different relevant actors of the process. 
Experience showed that European supranational institutions, national governments, 
European and federalist personalities and movements all played an important role at  
specific moments, and this interpretative scheme helped to conceptualize their interaction, 
going beyond the traditional formulations of the main theories, such as neo-functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism, which tend to emphasize one set of actors as the main one.  
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1.1 The role of  crises 
 
According to the federalist tradition, the basic push of the European unification 
process was linked to the historical crisis of the nation state - already discussed in the 
Ventotene Manifesto – namely the impossibility for the European nation-states to ensure 
their economic development and security by themselves. These latter goals required states 
characterized by a vast geographic extension,   as shown by the success of the U.S. and the 
USSR, the two super powers that divided the world and Europe into spheres of influence, 
even determining the domestic regime of the states under their hegemony.  
This structural and long term situation was masked by the dominant nationalist 
ideology, but manifested itself through the existence of supranational problems. 
Occasionally these problems turned into socially perceived crises on specific issues, which 
Albertini called “crises of national powers” (on the two concepts of crisis of the nation 
state and of national powers see Castaldi 2001). A similar view is proposed by realist 
authors who consider European integration as a mere instrument of national states to solve 
certain  common problems in the economic and political fields that cannot be faced by a 
single state (see Milward 1984, 1992, and Milward et al. 1994). Federalists consider however 
the crises of national powers  as a symptom and a reflection of the historical crisis of the 
nation state, and therefore identify in the European federation a structural solution. 
As the intergovernmental tradition argues, when dealing with a supranational 
problem states normally seek the way of mere cooperation. Nevertheless, a socially 
perceived crisis on a supranational problem may be the necessary precondition  for states 
to decide and carry out a transfer or pooling of sovereignty – provided the European and 
federalist personalities and organizations had the ability and strength to pursue that 
proposal (see Albertini 1965 now in 1999a: especially pp. 240-243; and 1966, now in 1999b: 
especially pp. 65-73). The crisis may involve a nation state or the Community and the 
European Union as a whole. When the EU plays a decisive role in dealing with certain 
problems a crisis of the EU itself can trigger a set of opportunities to re-launch the 
integrative or disintegrative dynamic. 
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The importance of the social perception of the crisis, or of a single problem and its 
supranational character, has to be underlined. The American request for German 
rearmament during the Korean War can be regarded as a minor crisis, because after the fall 
of the EDC the creation of a German army was carried out without major tensions with 
France, also thanks to the collocation of both within the Atlantic framework. But the idea 
of a German army was socially perceived as a serious danger and this allowed statesmen of 
the day to propose and bring to the verge of ratification the creation of a European army. 
On the other hand, the crisis of Bretton Woods was very serious, but the project of 
monetary union failed in the seventies, and it was carried out only after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in order to anchor the reunited Germany to Europe, by the Europeanization of 
it main element and symbol of  power, the Deutsche mark. 
The concept of crisis has a fundamental theoretical value. The “crisis of national 
powers” can be called  upon to explain the windows of opportunity and therefore the 
timing of the debates, choices, and the stages of the process of unification. The crisis 
functions as a catalyst for decisions. It is the nature of the crisis which determines the type 
of possible decision, and eventually progress. 
The crisis related to the American request of German rearmament explains both 
the time and the military character of the proposal of a new Community - and the fact that 
a personality like Monnet, often (wrongly) considered a neo-functionalist, proposed the 
creation of a European army and  a transfer of sovereignty on the point of greatest 
potential national resistance. Confronted with a crisis on the military field he could not 
respond with an economic solution,  as the collapse of Bretton Woods was followed by the 
project of monetary union, but rather with a revival of the idea of military integration, 
which again re-emerged during the Convention at the time of the second Iraqi war, 
bringing about the provisions about structural cooperation on defence in the Constitutional 
Treaty and then in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Finally, the notion of crisis can clarify the role of various actors, which can 
significantly vary during the process. The role of European and federalist figures and 
organizations depends on their ability, at a given time, to identify the supranational 
problem on which a socially perceived crisis could break out, and thus to mobilize 
consensus around proposals aimed at advancing the unification process to solve at least 
partially these crises. If they manage, these actors have a role and their proposals enter the 
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public debate. If they don’t, they disappear from the political scene. Similarly, in the 
absence of a crisis their propaganda activities are unlikely to lead to decisions involving a 
real advancement of the unification process, with regard to the transfer of competences - 
integration – and to the institution-building and the strengthening of supranational 
decision-making mechanisms – European construction more broadly. 
All this means that no one - including the Federalists, notwithstanding what 
Milward and Moravcsik argue - believes that nation-states can decide about the transfer of 
sovereignty for federalist reasons (conceived in an ideological way, ie. for the sake of 
European unity as an ideal). On the contrary, a favorable ideological vision is only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a national leader to take decisions regarding a 
transfer of competences or powers when this choice is the best solution to respond to a 
crisis. An ideological nationalist vision, on the other hand, does not allow taking such a 
decision, notwithstanding the costs of the missed solution of the crisis. The differences of 
economic growth, unemployment levels and inflation rate between the European states 
and the United States after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system show the cost of the 
failure to reach monetary unification in the seventies, especially when compared to the 
apparent positive effects on the European economy from the birth of the euro. 
The crises of national powers being socially perceived force governments to take 
actions and thus act as  catalysts for decisions. They determine the window of opportunity 
for substantial decisions about the unification process with reference to the problems on 
which the historical crisis of the nation state shows itself at that particular time. The crises 
are therefore a necessary condition - for reasons explained by intergovernmental analysis 
about the normal inclination of national governments not to transfer competences and/or 
powers to Europe - but an insufficient one, to advance the process. The crises - which are 
not determined by the actors voluntarily, although their social perception is also linked to 
their behaviour - offer windows of opportunity that require the active intervention of other 
actors to be exploited. The concepts of initiative and European  leadership now deserve 
consideration. 
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1.2 The role of  the initiative 
 
The second element of the conceptual scheme developed by the federalists in order 
to understand the dynamics of the process is thus that of  “initiative.” Facing a crisis it is 
possible to provide different answers, more or less effective and with a different 
relationship between costs and benefits for different groups involved. Obviously, not all 
answers will involve an advance in the European unification process. It is therefore 
essential to the process that someone takes the initiative to develop and propose solutions 
to the crisis involving such an advance. Since governments typically seek the way of mere 
cooperation, this role is more easily embraced by Europeanist and federalist personalities 
and movements. The role of Monnet, Spinelli, and the organizations that supported them, 
has often been to identify clearly and precisely the supranational character of the crisis, and 
then propose solutions that involved a strengthening of the unification process (Albertini 
1966 and 1968).  
The concept of “initiative” identifies the role of ideas in the process,  a role also 
emphasized in recent years by social constructivism. Monnet’s idea of pooling sovereignty 
on coal and steel - a specific and limited sector, but essential to international relations, since 
it was the base of the military heavy industry of the time – was different from simple 
cooperation and less demanding than a complete political union. This idea determined the 
start and also some of the ensuing characteristics of the entire unification process. 
However, every step of the process was conceived and proposed in relation to the crises of 
the period. For example, when confronted with a military crisis – the Korean war and the 
following American demand for German rearmament – the previously distant and difficult 
idea of  political unity became feasible. Monnet proposed a European army, and Spinelli 
pointed out the inconsistency and the danger of any such project, if not supported and 
directed by a European democratic government. For each step of the process it is possible 
to identify the personalities and organizations that first devised a proposal and began to 
gather consensus around it. 
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1.3. The concept and role of  leadership 
 
Ideas and proposals - even if and when they are strong and well grounded - need to 
be transformed into concrete decisions. This is an issue of power and its exercise.  In this 
context, the concept of European “occasional” leadership has been developed (Albertini 
1973 and 1979). Only if a national government or a European institution develops or 
endorses a proposal from other promoters and inserts it the political agenda, is there any a 
chance of the proposal’s  being adopted. Who does that and builds the necessary 
intergovernmental agreement for the final decision de facto exercises a leadership position 
at the European level - even in the case of a national leader or government. But it is an 
occasional leadership because it is due to the desire to solve the crisis related to the 
proposal; if it were  due to the simple aspiration  of unifying Europe, this leadership would  
it would show itself in a consistent  manner and not just as a response to a crisis. 
The idea of the “occasional” nature of such  European leadership connects it to 
specific crises from a theoretical point of view, explaining why it is not possible for any 
national leader to devote priority to European integration, as personalities such as Monnet 
and Spinelli - whose role was, however, that of initiative rather than of leadership, did. 
Intergovernmental literature has often stressed that the national leaders involved in 
important integrative decisions were moved by the desire to solve problems and thus 
strengthen the power of the nation state rather than the will to unite Europe. That 
literature criticises the hagiographic literature concerning the "European Saints", as 
Milward calls them (1992, especially pp. 318-344; and also Moravcsik 1998). The concept 
of European “occasional” leadership incorporates the correct aspect of this criticism, while 
acknowledging the role and the European function played by national statesmen in certain 
historical phases. Of course, an ideological inclination in favour of European unity is still 
necessary in order assume such a role, supporting solutions to crises that also advance the 
European unification process. 
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1.4 The concomitant presence of  crisis, initiative and leadership and 
their duration 
 
A fourth aspect should be added to this scheme (crisis, initiative and occasional 
European leadership): the permanence of those conditions for all the duration of the 
decision-making and ratification of a given proposal. 
If the socially perceived crisis is resolved, or the social perception of the problem 
decreases, or the occasional European leadership is missing, the initiative that linked these 
two elements will be unlikely to have a positive outcome. For example, the fall of the EDC 
showed two of these circumstances: when the French National Assembly voted, the 
Korean war was over and there was hope for better relations with the USSR after Stalin’s 
death (the crisis was solved, and the social perception of the need of a European common 
defence consequently decreased), and there were throughout the period several changes of 
governments in France, causing the exclusion of both Pleuven and Schuman – who had 
provided the initial occasional leadership - from the government. 
This fourth aspect is obviously very relevant for the effective results of decision-
making, but not for the conceptualization of the conditions that can produce an advance of 
the unification process. The schema crisis-leadership-initiative substantially aimed at 
identifying the conditions when states and national governments may accept a transfer of 
competences and/or powers to Europe - developing the paradox proposed by Spinelli of 
nation states as both instruments and obstacle of the unification process. Under normal 
circumstances, the states represent an obstacle because they want to maintain their 
sovereignty. However, faced with a socially perceived crisis on a supranational problem, it 
is possible to witness the emergence of an effective European occasional leadership in at 
least one member state or in the European Union institutions, that can trigger a decision-
making process which, though dominated by the states, can lead to an advance in the 
unification process. 
This conceptual schema therefore identifies various functions – that can be 
performed by different actors in different phases - needed to advance the integration  
process. This schema brings together  the useful insights of a number of theories with 
regard to the main actors in the process. 
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The social perception of a crisis on a supranational problem can be promoted by 
European and federalist figures and movements, by parties, and even governments needing 
to move the responsibility of the crisis to others - Europe – or by organized social groups 
particularly affected by the crisis and aware of its supranational character, and the mass 
media related to all these subjects. This perspective goes beyond the analysis of the 
influence of specific political or social milieus on governments’ policies, proposed for 
example by Moravcisk. It emphasizes the need to identify - on a case by case basis – the 
relevant actors, without neglecting the possibility that they be relevant in a single case or on 
several occasions, but not necessarily at all times or in an uninterrupted manner. 
The role of farmer organizations in the birth and in the initial development of the 
CAP, including the institutional strengthening related to it, cannot for instance be ignored, 
although they did not play a significant role in any other case. The role of European and 
federalist personalities and movements with regard to the ECSC, the ECD attempt, 
Euratom, the direct election of the European Parliament, the creation of the European 
Council, or the creation of monetary union was certainly relevant (See Burgess. 1986; 
Burgess, 1989; Burgess, 1995; Burgess, 2000; Caraffini, 2008; Graglia, 2008; Landuyt,, 
Preda (eds), 2000; Levi, Pistone (eds.) 1973; Lodge, 1984; Majocchi, 1996; Monnet, 2007;  
Paolini, 1988; Paolini, 1989; Paolini, 1994; Paolini, 1996; Pasquinucci, 2000; Pinder, 1991; 
Pinder, 1993; Pinder, 1996; Pinder, 1997;  Pinder, 1998; Pistone (ed), 1975; Pistone, 1982; 
Pistone, 1992; Pistone 1996; S. Pistone, 1999; S. Pistone and  Malandrino (eds.), 1999;  
Preda, 1990 and 1994), although in other phases or over other issues they failed to play a 
decisive role.  
The federalist tradition believes that new integrative proposals are hardly likely to  
come from the national politicians busy with the struggle for national power - which they 
will be reluctant to give up once they get it. Therefore, the specific task of the European 
and federalist personalities and movements is that of  “initiative” (Albertini 1961, 1969, 
1980): the development of a proposal to solve the crisis through an advance of the 
unification process. This is reasonable to be expected from them, because it is their 
political priority and they are autonomous in relation to national power (Albertini 1955). 
This autonomy permits a dialogue with all political forces, being aware that decisions 
concerning European integration must be potentially bipartisan, since they involve the 
national governments of several countries and of different political families. 
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The European and federalist organization thus constitute the political class of 
European unification, trying to recruit and mobilize organisable pro-European personnel – 
politicians in favour of integration, even if they do not conceive it as their priority, and 
people who have abandoned national political life because of the crisis of the nation state 
but which have not yet realized the federalist alternative – and the pro-European sentiment 
diffused in the population at large (Albertini 1955, 1965 and 1966). 
Obviously, federalist authors have always stressed the role of the European and 
federalist personalities and organizations. However, this emphasis  is not necessary for a 
theoretical scheme aiming at conceptualizing the conditions of possibility for advancing the 
process. To this aim it is sufficient to identify an initiative, an idea pursued by a person or a 
group that can be accepted in the public debate, can be endorsed by a European occasional 
leadership, and then possibly adopted. For example, the neo-functionalist tradition has 
emphasized the role of the Commission as a guide for the integrative process in different 
periods, especially under the leadership of Monnet, Hallstein and Delors. It should be 
noted however that these figures are often considered as federalist personalities as well (see 
Monnet, 2007; Roussel, 1996 ; Bossuat, 1999 ; Duchêne, 1994; Fontaine, 1988 ; Fransen, 
2001; Hallstein, 1972; Loth et al., 1998;  Malandrino, 2005; Delors, 2009; Mile si, 1985; 
Grant, 1994; Ross, 1995; Drake, 2000). The European Parliament, after its direct election, 
was the main actor of several initiatives, starting from the Treaty of European Union, 
whose idea came from a federalist leader like Spinelli (See Albertini, 1985; Albertini, 1986, 
Burgess, 1989; Burgess, 2000; Dastoli, Pierucci, 1984; Lodge, 1984). 
As for ”occasional” European leadership, it requires a certain power, and can 
therefore be exercised only by a national government, guided perhaps  by a prime minister 
or foreign minister,(or less probably by a national parliament), the Commission, or the 
directly elected European Parliament. Precisely for this reason some historians and 
theorists have emphasized the role of national political leaders or of the leaders of the 
European institutions. Just as federalist scholars stress the role of federalist personalities 
and organization, intergovernmental theories, focusing on the intergovernmental 
negotiations that lead to a decision, naturally emphasize the role of governments in this 
phase and eventually come to recognize the existence of a European “occasional” 
leadership. However this is just the final stage and condition for the advance of the 
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integrative process.  Such approaches are ill-suited to account for other fundamental issues, 
such as the timing of integration.  
Moravcsik for instance argues on the one hand that the convening of an 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) by majority voting at the European Council in Milan 
in 1984 was unprecedented  and that for few days it was not clear whether the Great 
Britain would have join the IGC. However he does not wonder why such an extraordinary 
event took place, and simply explains the subsequent result of that ICG by a normative 
convergence of  the main governments on the neo-liberal agenda proposed by Mrs. 
Thatcher and the U.S. President Reagan, in the form of the Single Market project 
Moravcsik 1991 and 1998). But this analysis is not sufficient to explain the the rupture of 
the Luxembourg compromise with a majority vote on the convening of a IGC. 
Intergovernmental theories, and especially the sophisticated liberal intergovernmentalism 
developed by Moravcisk, are very useful and effective to explain the negotiations that lead 
to a decision in which the national governments are the decisive actors. However this is 
just the last step in a much longer decision-making process involving many different actors 
at various times and stages of the unification process, which cannot easily be explained 
from a purely intergovernmental perspective. 
 
2. The European response to the recent crises 
 
The analytical scheme developed so far suggests that a socially perceived crisis is a 
necessary if insufficient condition to produce  a new stage  of the process. Crises open up a 
window of opportunity for political entrepreneurs to propose a new initiative aimed at 
solving the crisis. And this initiative will have a chance to be adopted if a European 
occasional leadership – provided by a national government or a European institution – 
supports it and put it into the official political agenda. It is time to test this theoretical 
scheme on the current situation facing the EU. 
Since the beginning  of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, the European 
Union has been  in a permanent condition of crisis and uncertainty. Officially the whole 
world is facing the crisis, but in many emerging countries this has meant only slower 
growth, rather than a significant recession. The crisis hit Europe particularly hard for 
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several reasons, but there is not enough social perception of the main reason: Europeans 
live with a single market, a single currency, but with  27 separate national economic, fiscal, 
industrial policies. This is a perfect recipe for  European economic decline to continue. 
 
2.1. The European response to the economic and financial crisis 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers opened up a deep financial crisis which impacted 
dramatically on the world economy, making growth and employment plummet. The world 
resisted the protectionist temptation, contrary to the 1929 crisis, and there was some 
measure  of coordination in identifying the general direction in which answers should be 
sought.. The results were rescue plans for the financial sector and stimulus packages for the 
economy.   
 Even if the private and public savings in the US are lower than in Europe, the US 
were able to launch a plan worth about 5,6% of their GDP. China could do even more (7% 
of GDP), as a result of  its high savings. Europe’s plans amount only to 1,5% of GDP. 
This is partly due to the fact that Europe has more robust automatic stabilisers, inherent in 
its more generous social security provisions compared to other areas of the world. 
However, the difference between Europe and  the other main economic areas, exemplified  
by the overall small amount of extra resources Europe devoted to the crisis response, 
remains staggering. 
Fundamentally, Europe lacks a European government to develop, launch and run a 
significant plan. No European institution is yet endowed with the relevant fiscal powers 
and the corresponding democratic legitimacy. At the same time national governments are 
constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact and cannot act either. Nor is the national 
level the appropriate one, considering the interdependence of the European economy, 
entrenched in the Single Market and the Single Currency. The Pact is necessary to avoid 
“beggar your neighbour” policies, but it is clearly insufficient. It is only a limited surrogate 
to a proper European economic and fiscal policy. The contradiction of a European 
currency without a European government has started to emerge in all its dramatic 
significance. 
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 Faced with this crisis the European institutions retreated, leaving the floor to the 
national governments, which took the issue in their hands with a special meeting where 
they managed to agree only to inform each other about the measures each will take: hardly 
a significant form of coordination. The domino effect provoked by one country providing 
a full guarantee on bank deposits while the others initially did not, showed the 
ineffectiveness of this method. The Europeans should have learned that mere cooperation 
or coordination does not work, because the complete failure of the Lisbon Agenda – which 
was supposed to make the EU the most dynamic, innovative and competitive economy of 
the world by 2010 – can be attributed precisely to the open method of coordination on 
which it was based, which refused to endow the European supranational institutions 
(Parliament, Commission and Court) with adequate powers and to introduce Qualified 
Majority Voting into the Council on those issues.    
 All this resulted in a dramatic failure to launch a European rescue plan aimed at a 
robust recovery of the European economy. National governments increased their deficits, 
putting aside the Stability and Growth Pact, essentially to finance temporary social 
measures, such as longer unemployment subsidies and similar instruments. A vast 
investment plan, as proposed by the Delors Plan as long ago as  1985, failed to materialise. 
 This crisis was socially perceived, but its European rather than national dimension 
was not. Unfortunately, no successful answer is possible at the national level and this 
provokes a substantial lack of responsibility and action. Significantly, at the first G20 
attended by Obama, the Italian Prime Minister told the new American President that the 
crisis came from the US and that it was upon the US to bring the world out of it. This was 
a blunt expression of the general feeling of the European citizens: put the blame and the 
responsibility for  finding a solution on someone else rather than identify and develop the 
instrument and policies that Europe itself could adopt to lead the world out of the crisis. 
This attitude is well exemplified by the European demand to reform the rules of the main 
international organizations and the regulation of the financial market,without a parallel 
willingness to merge European quotas  in the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, a change which would make the EU, rather than the US, the main share holder and 
agenda-setter in these bodies.  
Similarly, Europeans failed to respond to the proposal from the Governor of the 
Bank of China for a structural reform of the international monetary system, towards a 
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multipolar and multilateral structure, based on the use of the Special Drawing Rights of the 
IMF for international trade and transactions. (See a series of speeches and short papers 
delivered by Zhou Xiaochuan, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/, especially 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178 where he refers explicitly to 
Keynes and Triffin studies; see also Mosconi, 2009; and even before the crisis Iozzo, and 
Mosconi, 2006). The proposal can be viewed, cynically, as a way to socialise globally the 
American debt to China, but such an interpretation would only grasp a part of the picture. 
Obviously, China is today the main American creditor, as Japan and Europe have been at 
times in the past. Therefore China has the problem of finding a way to constraint the US to 
adopt sound policy and to avoid devaluing the dollar, which Americans like to consider 
“our currency and your problem”. But this Chinese aspiration is in fact in the interest of 
the whole world too.  
Interestingly, even in the US the elite has shown a renewed consciousness of the 
fact that the USA’s role of issuer of the main reserve asset and the pivotal role of the dollar 
in the international system, was one of the structural factors which made the crisis possible 
(Dunaway 2009, Council of Foreign Relations Special Report n. 45). This situation 
provides the US with the possibility to issue liquidity on the basis of the world economy 
demand, rather than on the US economy’s capacity, and to finance accordingly structural 
imbalances in the American public budget and in the current account. However, the Report 
considers such a feature of the system impossible to reform, and therefore only 
recommends each country to redress those imbalances because it is good for the world. 
This well-constructed economic argument falls unfortunately against the diktat of political 
argument: why should an American president decrease the chances of winning the next 
election – his own re-election or that of the Congress – by raising taxes or cutting 
expenditure to finance his preferred programs, if he can simply have the rest of the world 
paying via cheap credit, coupled with the possibility to devalue the dollar at a latter stage to 
avoid paying it back to a certain extent? This explains very well the policy of butter and 
cannons, tax cuts and vast increases of military expenditure, which followed 9/11. 
American and Chinese both recognise the structural conditions making possible  global 
imbalances and  the credit bubble, but their policy recommendations are as divergent as 
their interests. 
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 The problem with Europe is that it has proved  quite unable to agree upon  an 
interpretation of the crisis and of its interests, and thus lay the groundwork for a truly 
European strategy to deal with the crisis. Some European think tanks have joined this 
global debate – for example the Triffin Foundation and the Compagnia di San Paolo held a 
conference in Italy last May to launch the “‘TRIFFIN 21’ An Initiative revisiting the 
arguments for a global monetary anchor” – but at the official and political level Europe 
was substantially absent, thus de facto supporting the current system. 
In other words, the first wave of the economic and financial crisis produced rather 
limited answers in Europe. European and federalist personalities and organizations called 
for some form of European economic government. They produced some documents and 
action, just as different European think tanks made proposals with the same aim. The ECB 
asked for more power to supervise the banking system, and also demanded to complement 
monetary union with a fiscal one, proposing the “equivalent of what we would have if we 
were in a fiscal federation … A federal solution would require a huge leap forward at the 
institutional level. It seems to me that a fully fledged political federation is not, at present, 
wanted by the countries themselves, speaking as a citizen, it is a matter of regret to me that 
the chance to take further steps was not seized in the 1990s” (interview by Governor 
Trichet, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100713.en.html). 
The asymmetry, or contradiction, of a monetary union without an economic and fiscal one, 
had obviously started to make itself felt. . The Commission, almost turned into a secretariat 
of the Council under Barroso’s presidency, was essentially unable to bring forward 
significant proposals. Also the European Parliament, busy with the 2009 election, was 
unable to take significant action. No European occasional leadership emerged to face the 
crisis 
 
2.2. The European response to the sovereign debt crisis 
 
 On the top of the economic and financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis 
came this year to threaten the achievements of the European construction. The very 
existence of the Euro seems in peril. Competent commentators and scholars debate the 
issue. Still the broad public debate treats the problem as if it was only the issue of one or 
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more countries having taken an irresponsible fiscal policy, as  if at stake was Greece alone 
rather than the survival of the Euro and the European Monetary Union. From such a 
distorted perspective German public opinion’s hostility to  any rescue plan can be easily 
understood. German Chancellor Merkel even allowed the crisis to get worse, to avoid 
providing any help before the election in North Rhine-Westfalia, from which her majority 
in the second chamber depended. The spread between German and Greek bonds was thus 
allowed to increase further, making the need for a European rescue of Greece all the more 
necessary and expensive. Eventually, three days before the regional elections, the EU was 
forced to take action and on May 9 decided to set up a 750 million € fund. The European 
markets rebounded , only to start a new decline the day after, having seen that Europe had 
found some money, but had no real new proposal in terms of policies and institutions to 
deal with this kind of problems now and in the future. 
The way this crisis was handled suggests a deep misunderstanding of the whole 
project of monetary union and of European unification, and a complete lack of European 
leadership. It is worth recalling the debate which accompanied the establishment of the 
EMU and the creation of the Euro from the Maastricht Treaty onwards. It was clear that 
the EMU was a crucial step towards political Union. Eventually this could bring different 
people to be in favour or against the EMU, precisely because of their attitude towards 
political union. But this link was recognized by both nationalists (For example see Cash, 
1991, especially chapter 3) and federalists (For a theoretical account of this link from a 
federalist perspective see among others Albertini 1973, 1976, 1979, 1990, now all in 
Albertini 1999a), and by politicians (For example see Portillo, 1998, 9 and his quotation of 
the German Chancellor Kohl and President of the Bundesbank Tietmayer at p. 17), 
academics (for example see Buchanan, 1990. Neo-functionalism developed the concept of 
spill-over to explain the automatic and smooth passage from economic to political 
integration), and economistsIII alike, with the exception of some British pro-Europeans 
who downplay the significance of this link in the attempt to persuade the Eurosceptic 
British public to join EMU (see Duff (ed.), 1998). This link is based on the consideration of 
the strict relationship between monetary and economic and fiscal policies, and to some 
extent to foreign policy as well, because the EMU creates the possibility of a unitary 
representation of the Euro in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
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thus requiring a much stronger co-ordination of national foreign policies and possibly a real 
single European foreign policy.  
 The lack of comprehension of something which was clear when monetary union 
was established – but for which there was not sufficient political will, otherwise the 
economic and political unions would have been established together with the monetary one 
– is putting the Euro at risk. Seen from the outside the European behaviour is really 
incomprehensible. California is almost bankrupt, like Greece. And if it was an independent 
state it would be the sixth largest world economy, much larger than Greece. But nobody 
believes that the existence of the Dollar is at risk, as there is an American federal 
government. The lack of a federal government in Europe allows a small economy such as 
Greece  to endanger the whole monetary union.  
 This issue is not limited to the economy. If one looks at Greece’s budget, the 
amount of military expenditure is astonishing. Given the tension with neighbouring Turkey 
over Cyprus, Greece is the EU country with the highest GDP% on military expenditure, 
above 4%. Overall, while the EU has no military expenditures, its 27 member states 
together make up for almost 50% of US military expenditure, with an actual capability 
which is much less than proportional, but with more theoretically active personnel, (this is 
revealing of about the amount of budget devoted to wages and the amount devoted to 
equipment and research as compared to the US). Security is just another public good which 
could best be provided at European rather than national level. Given the current level of 
expenditure and capacity, a European single defence could even allow for both a decrease 
of expenditure and an increase of capabilities! And it would also contribute significantly to 
the structural reduction of the Greek deficit, as the contribution of Greece to the 
European defence would presumably be proportional to its population and economic 
performance. 
 The sovereign debt crisis has put at risk the Euro and many other countries  in 
financial difficulties. Europeans have had to take action, starting a new debate which 
recognised the need for a European economic government or at least a European 
economic governance.. What form these new structures should take is, however, far from 
clear. 
The French request for a European economic government received the German 
answer: “yes, it’s us”, i.e. the national governments within the European Council. Not 
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anything new, as this institution still decides very often by unanimity, and therefore often 
does not decide at all. Confronted with the first crisis it managed only to agree that each 
state should inform the others of its action: not a very promising record to deserve a 
candidacy as the new European economic government. Furthermore, the European 
Council’s  deliberations still take place  to a large extent behind closed doors, and therefore 
with little transparency and democratic participation. A Task force chaired by the 
European Council President, Van Rompuy, is supposed to present more detailed proposals 
next autumn.   
The European institutions have intervened with various degrees of innovative 
capacity, political courage, and guiding philosophy. The European Commission presented 
in May its proposal for “Reinforcing economic policy coordination” (Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the 
Regions of 12/5/2010). But coordination was the maximum objective the Commission put 
forward, far short of the idea of a European economic government, which was already at 
the centre of the public debate. The main proposal of the Commission was the creation of 
a European semester to synchronise the preparation and scrutiny by the Commission and 
all national governments of the budget proposals of each member state. Other proposals 
were to ensure more strict adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact, with special 
relevance to the debt criterion and by limiting the access to the EU budget for non-
complying member states, and the creation of new rules about when and hot to provide 
financial help in terms of loans to a member state in financial difficulties, a step  which 
essentially codified the decision taken at the 9th of May European Council. 
 Faced with such a weak proposal, the European Central Bank, which bears alone 
the burden of steering the Euro, put forward its proposals for “Reinforcing Economic 
Governance in the Euro Area”. Many of the proposals were actually quite similar and 
convergent with the Commission proposals, but often more detailed and nuanced, for 
example regarding the enlargement of the range of sanctions that can be used within the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. New proposals were the strengthening the Eurogroup role in 
financial surveillance of member states, the creation of an independent EU fiscal agency 
and the possibility for the Commission to present proposals about sanctions that can be 
modified only by unanimity within the Council and approved by qualified majority – a 
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power that the Commission did not dare ask for itself. Overall, the ECB proposals go 
further than the Commission in empowering Europe to deal with the crisis. The overall 
philosophy however, is absolutely technocratic. The Parliament is never mentioned, and 
there is no reference to  the principle “no taxation without representation”. The idea of an 
independent fiscal agency and of stricter European control over national budgets without 
any involvement of the European and/or national Parliament looks democratically 
inconsistent, and thus hardly practicable. 
 There is however, another issue conspicuously absent from all the proposals 
mentioned: the European budget. This ridiculously small instrument (1% of the EU GDP), 
which has decreased over time while each new Treaty has enlarged the EU competences, 
which has almost lost all its “own resources” in the wake of the world-wide liberalization 
process,  is only a sum of national contributions that each country want as small as 
possible. The fact that no significant European government, but probably not even 
governance, can be achieved without a reform of the budget, seems not to figure in the 
current debate. Nevertheless, several prominent economists and think tanks have presented 
proposals to fill this gap, for example Notre Europe launched a debate on this issue 
starting with a paper by Alfonso Iozzo, Stefano Micossi and Maria Teresa Salvemini (2008).   
 In a fascinating article Steingart suggests that “Birthdays are fun; a birth itself is not. 
There’s a lot of screaming and groaning, and even in the easiest deliveries, there’s always 
the fear that something will go wrong.  The birth of a state is no less difficult. Indeed, what 
pessimists — including many here in Germany — see as an existential crisis for the 
continent is really just the latest stage in the birth pangs of a new country. While we should 
of course worry about Greek debt, we should also have hope that we are witnessing the 
end of the euro zone as an abstraction and the birth of the United States of Europe”. This 
suggests what Europe needs, more than what we are witnessing, unfortunately. Looking at 
the proposals on the table there is ground for concern about the chances of this delivery 
finally taking place. The European unification process has been in some ways  the mother 
waiting to deliver since the 9th of May 1950 when the Schuman Declaration paved the way 
to the first European Coal and Steel Community, considering that start as “the first 
concrete foundation of a European federation” (available at 
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm). Indeed by putting at risk the Euro 
this crisis is more existential than others previously. The contradiction between the single 
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market, the single currency and a number of different economic and fiscal policies is 
structural and now publicly exposed. Significantly, one of the main Italian newspapers Il 
Corriere della Sera, recently had an opinion poll on its web-site asking readers to express 
their opinion on the creation of a European federal government to avoid other crises like 
the Greek one, and got an 85% positive answer. To create a European economic 
government implies a revision of the budget, the attribution of fiscal powers to the EU – 
which the first ECSC had, together with the possibility of making debts – and a democratic 
system to decide on these crucial issues. Probably, such a decision would involve also a 
further transfer of competences to the EU in areas such as defense for which the national 
level is clearly sub-optimal..  
 
3. Conclusions 
  
The crises are there. Some initiatives are on the table. The official ones are largely 
insufficient in terms of effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. The public debate in the 
papers and in the think tanks has however highlighted some of the key issues, from the 
reform of the budget to the need of a democratic system of government. So far it is 
difficult to identify any candidate to take the role of European occasional leadership. The 
conditions for an advance in the unification process highlighted in the theoretical 
interpretative scheme developed in the first part of this paper do not seem to be present. 
But the Euro is still in trouble, the crisis is still far from being solved, and this may 
eventually push the European political leadership to finally find the courage to do what it 
takes: to renounce to the last simulacrum of a substantially empty national sovereignty to 
create a federal government, i.e. a democratic multilevel system of government. There can 
be glory waiting around the corner for some of the European political leaders, if they will 
finally decide to help the delivery of this long-awaited baby. 
 
                                               
I Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Pavia and one of the 
main leaders of the European federalist organizations. He wrote many articles about European integration, 
mainly in Italian. Thus he is little-known in the English language based international academic debate. Still he 
was a main figure in the Italian debate and after his death two selections of his most important articles were 
published in 1999, and this year the last volume of all his works was published by Il Mulino, edited by 
Nicoletta Mosconi†. He never wrote a systematic book about European integration. His theory must be 
reconstructed from a number of articles published since the late 1950s. I am currently working on an 
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anthology in English of some of his most interesting papers 
III See for example, Issing, 1996; and Padoa Schioppa, who played a significant role in the establishment of 
the EMU and stressed several times that the ECB risked to be isolated rather than independent, proposing a 
strengthening of the other European supranational institutions (see for example one of his lectures of 1999 
available on the internet at http://eurplace.org/diba/cultura/fagg/padoas.html or the article Questo mondo 
a due velocità, in Il Corriere della Sera 31/12/1999; and more recently his 2006 Altiero Spinelli Lecture at the 
Centre for Studies on Federalism, available at 
http://www.csfederalismo.it/attachments/023_Lecture%20Padoa-Schioppa%20eng.pdf). 
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